Tycoon 2FA proves that the old promises of "strong MFA" came with fine print all along: when an attacker sits invisibly in the middle, your codes, pushes, and one-time passwords become their codes, pushes, and one-time passwords too.
Tycoon 2FA delivers a phishing-as-a-service kit that hands even modestly skilled attackers a turnkey adversary-in-the-middle platform. The system sits between the user and the real site via reverse proxy, relaying what the victim sees, and capturing everything the victim sends -- passwords, 2FA codes, and crucially, the resulting session cookies.
Once Tycoon captures a live session, it simply rides that session token into the target account, neatly sidestepping the very MFA the victim just completed. Newer versions add obfuscation and evasion features to defeat security tooling, pushing this from "clever trick" to industrialized capability that criminals can rent and reuse at scale.
Most enterprises still lean on "legacy" MFA: SMS codes, TOTP apps, email links, and simple push approvals. All these share one fatal weakness that Tycoon exploits -- they depend on user-shared secrets or one-time responses that attackers can relay in real time through an adversary-in-the-middle.
Attackers no longer need to break your crypto; they only need to trick your user into completing a familiar flow on an untrusted page. Modern phishing kits make the fake page look and behave exactly like your IdP, use plausible domains in the URL, and consume any code the user enters instantly through the attacker's backend. In that world, "something you know" and "something you have that just shows you a code" become, at best, latency hurdles -- not security barriers.
Enterprises now face a stark question: do they keep hardening old models that attackers can still proxy?
Or should they move to authentication that cannot be replayed?
The second path means tying access to:
Modern FIDO2/WebAuthn flows deliver exactly this: challenge-response using device-resident private keys, with phishing resistance baked in because the authenticator binds responses to both the origin and the key. When you implement it correctly, even a flawless Tycoon-style proxy cannot impersonate the cryptographic identity it never controls.
Hardware biometrics add the crucial layer: they bind the hardware key truly to the human. Instead of "whoever holds this token," the model becomes "whoever holds this token and matches the biometric template that only this token can verify."
Common biometric modalities in this context include:
The key design principle: raw biometric data never leaves the hardware. Instead, the device uses a stored template to unlock a key or assert user presence locally, then signs a challenge from the relying party.
Strong biometric MFA depends not just on what you use, but on where it lives. Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) and similar secure elements exist specifically to:
For biometrics, this means templates and key material must live inside the TPM or secure element and never synchronize to a cloud service. Cloud-stored biometrics create a permanent, unrevocable liability: people cannot rotate their fingerprints or faces the way they rotate passwords. When compromise becomes inevitable, the architecture must ensure that what leaks consists of revocable public keys or session artifacts -- not the raw factors that make a person who they are.
Vendors now push hardware biometrics into more convenient, always-with-you form factors while preserving phishing-resistant design. Token's biometric ring, for example, uses an onboard capacitive fingerprint sensor and an EAL5+ certified secure element to store FIDO2 credentials, turning a wearable into a phishing-resistant authenticator that never exposes private keys. The recently announced Token BioKey line extends this model into USB, Bluetooth, and NFC security keys with on-device fingerprint verification and hardware-protected FIDO credentials for enterprise deployments.
Similarly, new approaches from companies like Badge, Inc. focus on using biometrics as an input to cryptographic processes that can deterministically reconstruct private keys on demand without ever storing the biometric itself in a recoverable form. In these systems, the biometric never leaves the secure execution environment and never persists directly; what persists consists of either hardware-protected cryptographic material or transformed data that remains useless without the original biometric presented locally again. That architecture sharply limits the blast radius of any backend compromise, because the data an attacker steals cannot impersonate the user or regenerate keys.
Tycoon 2FA and its successors represent not edge cases but the logical end state of a world that still trusts user-readable codes and browser-visible flows as "strong" authentication. As long as enterprises rely on MFA factors that attackers can proxy, prompt, and replay, adversaries-in-the-middle will continue turning those very protections into attack surfaces.
Rebuilding authentication around hardware biometrics -- keys and wearables with on-device biometric verification, backed by TPMs and secure elements, speaking FIDO2/WebAuthn -- fundamentally changes the game. This approach replaces secrets that travel with proofs that never leave the device, and binds identity to cryptography that phishing kits cannot silently inhabit or relay.
Organizations that refuse to revisit their 2FA choices now effectively bet that attackers will stop innovating. Organizations that move to hardware-anchored biometrics bet, correctly, that the only safe factor remains one that users cannot hand over -- even when perfectly phished.