The message emerging from global negotiations at this year's COP30 is unmistakable: the world is on the verge of slipping past the 1.5 degree Celsius threshold, and the window for meaningful action is rapidly narrowing. Despite urgent warnings from the United Nations and decades of promises, the global north continues to fall short on its commitments to finance, equity, and climate justice -- even over 30 years after the Earth Summit first set a collective direction in Brazil. With the Paris Agreement struggling to deliver ambition at the scale and pace required, calls for a renewed, reimagined form of climate multilateralism -- one shaped by the priorities, realities, and leadership of the global south -- have become louder and more compelling than ever.
In this moment of reckoning, we, parliamentarians from some of the world's most climate-vulnerable South Asian countries, put forward the idea of regional climate multilateralism as a concrete response to that call. We see this as a model grounded in solidarity and justice but animated by the urgency that COP30 has made impossible to ignore. Such a framework must enable South Asian nations to pool scale, resources, knowledge, and diverse climate needs, while sharing technological and financial capacities in sectors where transformation cannot wait.
South Asia has been living with the intensifying impacts of climate change for well over a decade. Studies show that by 2050, the region could face economic losses amounting to nearly 1.8 percent of its annual GDP due to floods, sea-level rise, extreme heat, and droughts, alongside irreversible non-economic losses in the form of lives, livelihoods, cultural practices, and traditions. The region's shared geography, ecosystems, and resources are layered over a long, intertwined political and developmental history. This combination makes South Asia acutely vulnerable to climate risks, but it also creates opportunities for coordinated action -- if countries choose to act strategically and together.
It is, therefore, imperative that South Asian countries create robust institutional mechanisms to respond to the climate emergency in ways that are mutually beneficial and capable of projecting a strong, unified voice in global climate forums. Moving in this direction would mean willing South Asian nations taking the initiative to establish a shared regional body -- potentially named the "South Asian Climate Cooperation Council (SACCC)" or the "South Asian Climate Change Coalition" -- hosted on a rotational basis and guided by clearly defined priority areas for collaborative action.
The urgency and criticality of a looming threat like climate change should compel us to work collaboratively as well as strategically. This targeted regional coalition or institution must be designed not only to mitigate risks and tap opportunities for South Asian countries, but also to ensure its own political sustainability.
The idea of such a regional coalition on urgent security, climate, and disaster risk-related matters is not new. The Quad (strategic partnership between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), for instance, was created in response to post-humanitarian and disaster assistance needs following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The region has a history of bilateral disaster-risk assistance, such as during the Nepal earthquake, various cyclones, and the Maldives water crisis. This is the level of urgency required for climate action in the region today, prioritising both mitigation and adaptation on a war footing.
Other regions in the global south have also demonstrated the power of theme-based coalitions to tackle climate change and manage the energy transition. The Eastern (or Western) Africa Alliance on Carbon Markets and Climate Finance, formed to facilitate market mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, is one such example. Its aim is to build on existing institutional frameworks and capacities of participating countries. The ASEAN Climate Change and Energy Project under the ASEAN Centre for Energy is another multilateral initiative that could help shape the proposed SACCC.
One promising area is cross-border power connectivity. In 2014, SAARC countries signed the SAARC Framework Agreement for Energy Cooperation (Electricity) to facilitate the integrated operation of the regional grid. There have been advancements through a trilateral power transaction -- from Nepal to Bangladesh via the Indian power grid -- which is already operational. This could also be extended under the One Sun One World One Grid initiative, wherein Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and India could pool their conventional and non-conventional electricity resources and transmit power to each other during lean periods of production. The initiative has the potential to lower energy costs, diversify supply for energy-poor regions, and tap renewable and low-carbon resources.
Ahead of COP30, South Asian parliamentarians from Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives endorsed the idea of a South Asian joint institutional response to climate change at a meeting held in Colombo in October this year. The meeting, organised by the South Asian Regional Parliamentary Forum (SARPF) for Climate, Energy and Environment, also discussed possible constitutive principles and a roadmap for realising the SACCC.
There was overwhelming consensus that such a coalition must be formed on the basis of a unique South Asian climate solidarity framework that champions both intraregional justice -- foregrounding the poorest and most marginalised -- and interregional justice -- forming a bloc against the skewed trade and financial practices of the global north.
Among the many provisions, three themes or pillars could serve as the contours of the SACCC. First, a regional knowledge-sharing and innovation hub. South Asia should establish regional innovation centres co-managed by multiple nations to benefit from complementary practice-based knowledge. Maldives, for instance, could co-host a South Asia Coastal Climate Resilience Hub focusing on coral reef restoration, sustainable fisheries management, and renewable energy integration for maritime regions. Sri Lanka, with its Sri Lanka 30x30 and Life to Our Mangroves (LOM) initiatives, could offer expertise in nature-based solutions. The region could also draw from Bhutan's Gelephu Mindful City and India's Mission LiFE (Lifestyle for Environment) to scale up large urban development programmes that integrate sustainability with economic growth. India could additionally support the scaling-up of renewable energy installations, while ongoing power-sharing and grid efforts between India, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Nepal would provide further advantages.
Second, the establishment of a South Asia Green Climate Finance Facility. Translating solutions into action depends critically on the availability of finance. A regional financing facility would enable resource pooling, build capacity to absorb and monitor international finance, and develop a pipeline of high-priority, bankable projects. This could be achieved in coordination with multilateral agencies such as the ADB, World Bank, and Green Climate Fund. The facility could offer a range of instruments -- from bonds to risk-mitigation products -- to attract international climate finance, while also designing a regional pool of climate action projects to create a conducive environment for investment.
Third, a scientific commission to offer independent advice on the type, scale, and speed of climate action needed to safeguard South Asia's infrastructure, economy, and people across resilience, mitigation, and adaptation. The body should not only focus on fostering technological R&D and innovation but also identify low-hanging technological interventions that deliver low-cost, long-term, and wide-scale change. A collective policy focus across countries could leverage regional scale, lowering the costs of finance and technology. The commission could also convene leading research institutions across the region and facilitate data sharing to advance climate research and mitigate risks.
Climate action is no longer a matter of policy debate but one of how it can be done most cost-effectively. As COP after COP falters, it is time for the global south to define its own future. South Asia faces an unmatched developmental paradox: expanding climate-ready infrastructure while ensuring low carbon emissions. A homegrown, regional, institutional response to this paradox could help pave the way not only for peaceful coexistence but also for the co-production of a prosperous future.
Dr Sanjay Jaiswal, Ugyen Tshering, LM Abeywickrama, and Mohamed Ibrahim are members of parliament from India, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives, respectively.
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.