The U.S. has already invested considerable political and military capital into confronting Maduro, creating a dynamic in which stepping back without achieving a concrete objective would make it look weak.
The latest flashpoint in the already escalating U.S.-Venezuela tensions came last week after U.S. President Donald Trump confirmed a phone call with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro had taken place a week earlier. According to sources who spoke to the Miami Herald, Trump reportedly delivered an ultimatum to his South American counterpart: leave power now or face the consequences. The alleged offer included a safe exit for Maduro and his immediate family if he relinquished his power in Venezuela. Maduro reportedly countered with demands for global immunity and the ability to retain control over the Venezuelan armed forces if he relinquished political control, demands that Washington seemingly rejected. It is not entirely clear that Maduro has made up his mind about what he will do. His comments have vacillated from amenable to defiant, and he has frequently implored Venezuelans to take up arms and prepare to resist an attempt by the United States to intervene militarily in the country.
Following the call, President Trump declared that Venezuelan airspace should be considered "closed in its entirety," prompting Maduro to reportedly request a second call, which the Trump administration had allegedly ignored. The United States military now has 11 warships and approximately 15,000 troops massed in the region, a massive military arsenal that has been deployed with purpose, including the 22 Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). If Maduro refuses to leave the country, the Trump administration may feel compelled to take more aggressive action, beginning with, but not limited to, direct strikes against targets on Venezuelan soil. This could evolve to include U.S. special forces raids.
Although the U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean has been described publicly as a counter-narcotics effort, the scale of the deployment suggests a broader intent from Washington to build sustained pressure on Venezuela's leadership and to keep military options readily available if it chooses to escalate. The United States does not recognize Maduro as the legitimate ruler of Venezuela. In late July, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio posted on X, "Maduro is NOT the President of Venezuela and his regime is NOT the legitimate government. Maduro is the head of the Cartel de Los Soles, a narco-terror organization that has taken possession of a country. And he is under indictment for pushing drugs into the United States."
The majority of Venezuelans indeed voted to elect the opposition to Maduro in the 2024 presidential race, but election fraud is not the reason the U.S. has brought so much heavy firepower into the region. Speaking to Fox Business News recently, Rep. Maria Salazar (R-FL) said, "This is not going to be hard," in reference to dislodging Maduro and helping to stabilize Venezuela. She went on to discuss the potential for American oil companies to do business in Venezuela, the country with the world's most proven oil reserves. The parallels to Iraq are evident, and the lessons for what comes next after ousting a longstanding dictator should be apparent to most in the foreign policy and defense communities. At the same time, the U.S. has already invested considerable political and military capital into confronting Maduro, creating a dynamic in which stepping back without achieving a concrete objective would make it look weak.
Both Russia and China have remained mostly quiet and on the sidelines of the brewing tensions (the Wall Street Journal reported that Russia sent a high-ranking military adviser to Venezuela), even as both countries are allies of the Maduro regime. In an era of great power competition, Moscow and Beijing have a vested interest in Washington's foreign policy choices. Still, the Kremlin has been preoccupied with the war in Ukraine and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is focused on its ongoing trade war with the Trump administration. Russia and China were mostly absent during the Twelve Day War between their ally Iran, on the one hand, and Israel and the United States, on the other. Several other Venezuelan allies, including Belarus, Cuba, Iran, and Nicaragua, are also unable to offer much beyond rhetorical support. For an administration that touted its objective to 'end endless wars,' regime change in Venezuela would seem like a risky proposition and antithetical to President Trump's prioritization of bringing conflicts to a close, accomplishments that he has repeatedly highlighted to other world leaders.
Maduro has used the U.S. military build-up to his political advantage, denouncing the presence of U.S. forces off Venezuela's coast and portraying the recent maritime strikes on alleged drug-trafficking vessels as a pretext for regime change, which is not only plausible but will likely increase domestic support for him in a country where U.S. intervention is not viewed favorably. After The Washington Post reported that, during a September strike on one such vessel, a second attack was allegedly ordered against survivors of the initial hit -- a decision attributed in the reporting to a verbal directive from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth -- Venezuela's National Assembly issued a statement condemning the incident and announcing its intention to investigate the alleged second strike. If the follow-up strike occurred for the purpose of killing survivors who no longer posed a threat, it would raise serious legal concerns under the laws of armed conflict.
U.S. military action in Venezuela may be imminent. What is less clear, however, is what the Trump administration's strategy is, and how it is connected to the military resources deployed throughout the Caribbean. What is also unclear is the Trump administration's strategy for any "day after" scenario in the event that Maduro agreed to step down or was indeed toppled by force. Post-conflict scenarios are notoriously unpredictable, messy, and complex. The past two decades have not yielded many examples of successful regime change, particularly when it is initiated by external actors.